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Introduction
In this paper we investigate the influence of non-executive outside directors on the board on the innovative activities of European listed firms and the mediating role of competition in this process. Innovation has been identified as an essential determinant for growth and the competitive position of a firm in the market. An increasing number of recent studies have focused on factors influencing innovation strategies in publicly traded firms. In these typically manager-led firms, the separation of management and control goes along with a discretionary scope for decision-making which enables the management to pursue private objectives. Since investments in R&D projects are complex, and future outcomes are relatively uncertain and hardly to predict, managers may have incentives to focus on short-term financial performance at the cost of sustainable innovation strategies with a longer time horizon to avoid the risk of dismissal or to maximize short-term remuneration ( In this study, we contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, using comprehensive panel data, we were able to trace a complete network of interlocking directorates among all listed firms in 17 European countries for the period 2005 to 2011.
In addition, this cross-country research design allows us to examine the relationship between outside directors and innovation activities from a broader perspective compared to a single country design. Second, the empirical results provide further insights to evaluate the outcomes of outside directors on the board for the appointing firms. While the effect of non-executive outside directors on the board on the number of patent applications as a proxy for innovation is insignificant for the total sample and in industries with fierce competition, we find a significant negative influence if competition in the market is low suggesting that competition compensates for the negative influence of outside directors in terms of innovation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop our hypotheses based on the literature. In section 3 we discuss the legal and institutional framework, describe the compilation of the sample and the chosen methodology. In section 4 we present the empirical results regarding the influence of outside directors on the board on innovation. Section 5 concludes and illustrates the relevance for subsequent research in the field of firm networks and innovation.
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
Traditionally, economists use agency theory to explain managerial behavior. As large modern companies are characterized by the separation of ownership and control, managers have certain discretionary to pursue personal interests that may deviate from 4 shareholders' interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1964) . This conflict of interest gains particular importance regarding long-term oriented innovation strategies with risky and unpredictable outcomes that require reasonable investments in R&D activities (Aghion and Tirole, 1994) .
Investments in innovative long-term oriented projects might be reduced because of short-term maximization of profits that improve a manager's valuation by the board at the cost of lower returns to long-term projects (Hirshleifer, 1993) . Further, due to the rather unpredictable outcomes of innovation projects, risk-averse managers may reduce spending on innovative projects to avoid the risk of failure (Manso, 2011). On the contrary, managers may have incentives for a higher rate of innovative activities, since director remuneration is often strongly related to firm size rather than to profitability 
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Institutional and Legal Framework
While previous studies usually monitor the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and innovation on the country level, the use of a transnational dataset enables us to account for institutional and legal differences between countries 
Data and Econometric Set-Up
Our data was obtained from different sources which were linked together. The Table I. The definitions of the variables and sources are described in Table A1 Table I illustrates that the firms in the sample submit on average 19 patents per annum to the EPO. The mean difference t-test in Table II shows weak structural differences between firms in less competitive industries compared to firms in fiercely competitive markets with regard to patent applications. Further, the average fraction of outside directors on the board is about 30 percent in both subsamples.
(Table II: Mean Comparison t-Test)
Since the number of patent applications is restricted to non-negative integer values and also characterized by many zeros, we estimate count data models as the following:
where PAT it+1 denotes the future patent applications of firm i, Z it accounts for the share of non-executive outside directors on board of the respective firm and X it represents the set of our additional control variables. Furthermore, year, country and industry dummies were included in the regression model. To control for unobserved heterogeneity, we introduce fixed effects into the model by using the pre-sample mean method proposed by Blundell et al. (1999) . We estimate Poisson models as well as zeroinflated hurdle models as a robustness check. Since the presence of outside directors may be influenced by time-varying factors that cannot be observed, our regression model may suffer from an endogeneity bias. By using the yearly mean share of outside directors on the regional level (NUTS 3) and the number of firms in the region accordingly as instruments we perform the control function approach (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2010). This procedure did not provide evidence of endogeneity in the regression model.
Empirical Results
In line with previous research our results presented in column (a) of Table III show that an increasing share of outside directors on the board has no significant effect on firms' patent activities (Balsmeier et al., 2014 ). When we split the sample in the group of firms in a low (column (b)) and high (column (c)) competitive environment, we find that a one percent increase in the fraction of outside directors leads to a reduction of firms' patent activity by 0.44 percent in a less competitive environment.
For firms in the high competition subsample no significant effect is found.
(Table III: Regression Results)
A limitation of the empirical findings might be that we neglected investments in research and development (R&D) which have been identified to be essential for a firm's innovative performance Griliches, 1990 ; Pakes and Griliches, 1980). To address this concern, we repeated the estimations including information on R&D as an additional explanatory variable. Since a large number of European firms in the sample are exempted from the obligation to publish data on R&D, the sample is reduced to 3,648 firm-year-observations. The estimation results displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix remain qualitatively unchanged. If competition is low, the number of patent applications is reduced by 0.41 percent if the fraction of outside directors rises by one percent. With regard to R&D we find that a doubling on R&D investments significantly increases the patent activity by about a fifth in the full sample while the relationship is stronger in industries with higher competition intensity.
The empirical results remain robust when zero inflated hurdle models are applied as well as when the control function approach is implemented. Further, we tested the possibility of time constraints of outside directors but found no evidence that firms with and without a majority of busy outside directors differ in their monitoring activities.
Discussion
The empirical findings suggest a critical appraisal of outside directorships with respect to innovation. Outside non-executive outside directors on the board have a negative and significant influence on the number of patent applications of the firms they monitor when competition in the market is low. The negative relation may be due to the fact that outside directors are associated with generally restrictive monitoring and lower advising competences. One might argue that outsiders on the board face a lack of firmspecific knowledge and experiences mitigating their capability to evaluate long-term Note: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Note: dependent variable PAT t+1, clustered standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; since R&D expenditures are not available for all firms, regressions are performed for a sub-sample of 3.648 firm-year observations.
Tables and Figures
